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ABSTRACT
Marginalizing the “Other” in the Discourse of the 
Bush Administration’s War on Terror
by
Sherri H. Christensen
Dr. Thomas R. Burkholder, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Communication 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda-led terrorist attacks. President 
George W. Bush and his administration launched a campaign against Iraq in an effort to 
oust its leader, Saddam Hussein, and “liberate” the Iraqi people. Despite no credible 
evidence of Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks and the disdain of most of the global 
community, a majority of Americans supported the administration’s desire to attack Iraq.
In an effort to understand the impact of the Bush Administration’s framing of the war 
on terror on the American public, the “Other,” and the global community as a whole, this 
study analyzes four of President Bush’s public addresses. The resulting critique reveals 
that appealing to American exceptionalism, demonizing the enemy, and marginalizing the 
“Other” foster an ideology of dominance and inequality, while fueling tensions between 
East and W est, reinforcing stereotypes, and resulting in m ore terrorist activity.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
In the days and months immediately following the September II , 2001, terrorist 
attacks in New York and Washington, mucb of the world came together to grieve with 
and support the American people. On September 12, tbe liberal Paris newspaper Le 
Monde even proclaimed, “We are all Americans.” ' Despite the horrendous acts of 
violence, the international show of solidarity was uplifting. The Bush Administration 
vowed to fight the terrorists, specifically Osama bin Laden, and immediately instituted 
changes to ensure that all “terrorists” were kept away from American borders. Wben the 
United States learned that bin Laden was in Afghanistan, the U.S. military was deployed 
to the Middle East to launch an assault against him and his terrorist network, al Qaeda. 
For the most part, these actions were considered justified, as it became apparent soon 
after 9/11 that bin Laden was responsible for the attacks. Global goodwill began to wane, 
however, when the Bush Administration started issuing directives to Saddam Hussein and 
Iraq in 2002— directives that seemingly had nothing to do with bin Laden or tbe 9/11 
attacks. Political scientist Tareq Y. Ismael, a noted authority on Iraq, and Jacqueline S. 
Ismael posit.
' http://www.worldpress.org/specials/wtc/front.htm
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With Afghanistan effectively brought under US hegemony, Osama bin 
Laden was abruptly replaced with another personification of evil: Saddam 
Hussein. The marketing o f Saddam Hussein as a serious threat to 
international security was more challenging than the Bush Administration 
anticipated. [...] Nevertheless, widespread fears left Americans receptive 
to Bush’s claims about Saddam’s possession of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), wbich the media, the Bush Administration, and the 
British government, all repeatedly portrayed as an immediate threat to 
Western civilization, and indeed, to its very survival. While the American 
public bought the Bush Administration’s bill of goods on the necessity of 
war on Iraq, the rest of the world was unconvinced. (7)
In the ensuing months, the Bush Administration defied the United Nations and 
international law, and launched an all-out campaign of “shock and awe”  ̂ in an effort to 
oust Hussein and “liberate” the Iraqi people. The consequences of what is still going on 
in Iraq—the climbing death toll, the U.S. economic drain, the severing of diplomatic ties, 
the increase in terrorist activity, and the absolute destruction of that country, to name just 
a few—  are sure to be felt for many decades to come.
This thesis will argue that the Bush Administration’s framing of the war on terror— 
appealing to American exceptionalism, demonizing the enemy, and marginalizing the 
Other— effectively garnered the support of the American public and rationalized tbeir 
actions in the Middle East. According to GlobeScan and the Program on International
 ̂“Shock and awe” was a concept introduced by the Bush Administration’s Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. According to Bob Woodward in Plan o f  Attack, “[...] it 
meant building up so mucb force and conducting various ‘spiking’ operations and 
bombing that it might in itself trigger regime change” (102).
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Policy Attitudes (PIPA), a poll of 35 countries conducted in the summer o f 2004 revealed 
that when “asked how the foreign policy of President Bush has affected their feelings 
toward the US, in 30 countries a majority or plurality said it made them feel ‘worse’ 
about America Conversely, the results of a Harris Poll conducted in June 2003 
showed that “a majority of Americans [felt] good about the war, believe[d] that we were 
justified in attacking Iraq, and [did] not want to hear, or accept the possibility, that the 
reasons for going to war might have been misleading” (Taylor). While support for the 
war in Iraq has declined among Americans in recent years, a September 2006 CNN poll 
reveals that forty-three percent of Americans still believe Saddam Hussein was a part of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite the fact that the Bush Administration has admitted he 
had nothing to do with them (Poll). Furthermore, a July 2007 New York Times/CBS 
News poll shows a slight increase in support for military action in Iraq after “new 
warnings from the Bush Administration about heightened terrorist activity” (Thee).
Critics and scholars alike believe the Bush Administration’s controversial decision to 
attack Iraq is mired in a neoliberal ideology of imperialism and hegemony that creates a 
dialectical tension between East and West. In Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in 
the IP ' Century, sociologists James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer ask:
Why does Washington have to hide the real economic, political and 
military motivations for its interventions behind high moral principles? 
Basically, it is because the U.S. is an imperial democracy and moral 
rhetoric is used to sway or neutralize domestic public opinion. [...] Like 
all imperialist powers, Washington presents its violent interventions as 
measures intended to defend ‘national security.’ (139)
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There are a number o f salient reasons to study, analyze, and expose dominant 
discourse. Many believe the policies in the Bush Administration’s war on terror are 
ethnocentric and unilateralist, and are resulting in greater tensions around the world, an 
increase in terrorist activity, and pervasive anti-American sentiment. Additionally, the 
administration’s dialectical framing of the conflict (i.e., good vs. evil, moral vs. immoral, 
strong vs. weak) and consequent marginalization of the Other raise serious ethical 
concerns. O f course, American dominance is not a new concept, but globalization creates 
a dilemma unlike any we have seen before. In addition to revealing the effects of 
dominant discourse, it is my hope that this study may contribute to a growing body of 
research and scholarship that seeks to examine and contextualize America’s emerging 
role in the global community.
Globalization
We are bombarded daily with images of a multicultural and unified global 
community. At the same time, we see examples of growing anti-American sentiment 
around the world, particularly since the start of the war in Iraq. Globalization, for all its 
glitzy appeal, is inextricably linked to inequality, injustice, and power abuse, and the 
United States stands as the dominant force in the battle between the developed and 
developing worlds. At no other time in history have we been so exposed to the beliefs 
and ideas of other cultures, just as they have been exposed to ours. However, despite the 
benefits of globalization— access to a plethora of goods and services, and ease of 
international communication and travel, for example— there are undeniable drawbacks to 
this phenomenon. “Rapidly, in the span of a few years,” writes Jan Nederveen Pieterse, a
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professor who specializes in global sociology, “globalization has become a focal point of 
social criticism, a gathering point of collective discontent—due to financial instability, 
economic crisis, global inequality, deepening poverty and social exclusion, job loss, 
Americanization, and environmental deterioration” (28). It is alternately described as 
imperialistic or “the great equalizer.”
One thing that is certain, however, is that globalization in its current manifestation is 
corporate-led. In Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism’s Challenge to Democracy, 
internationally renowned political theorist Benjamin R. Barber argues, “There is no 
activity more intrinsically globalizing than trade, no ideology less interested in nations 
than capitalism, no challenge to frontiers more audacious than the market. By many 
measures, corporations are today more central players in global affairs than nations” (23). 
Multinational corporations and global institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) play prominent roles within the context of corporate 
globalization. Corporate globalization, also referred to as neoliberalism, relies on an 
autonomous market, diminishing social services, government deregulation, and 
privatization. In the quest for free trade, transnational corporations (TNCs) are gaining 
power while national sovereignty is being reduced. A predominant criticism of this 
phenomenon is the spreading of “consumerism” among traditional cultures. Political 
journalist William Finnegan writes, “Presented with special force to developing countries 
as a formula for economic management, [globalization] is also, in its fullness, a theory of 
how the world should be run, under American supervision” (42).
Many critics feel that the current trends in our globalizing world are also resulting in 
cultural homogenization, or worse, cultural imperialism, and it is Western, or more
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precisely, Ameriean, culture that is pervading the globe. Barber refers to this as 
“McWorld,” a culture that eschews traditional cultural practices while trumpeting a 
lifestyle based on consumerism and profit. Many fear the disintegration of culturally 
distinct ways and values as the world is inundated with American culture. American fast- 
food restaurants, television, films, and music saturate once traditional cultures. People all 
over the globe are beginning to dress alike, listen to the same music, watch the same 
films, and buy the same products. McWorld, as Barber presents it, is a consumer-driven 
culture that exists on the mass consumption of goods and services, while the ideas of 
community, culture, and spirituality/religion slowly disintegrate. It is an increasing 
awareness o f the Other, just as culture is becoming more homogenous, effectively 
negating “otherness.” It is the expansion of free market principles and institutions, and 
the simultaneous restriction of government regulation. It is not, as many believe, a true 
democracy. McWorld produces individualism, privatism, and materialism. In essence, as 
denizens of McWorld, we are so integrated in the consumerist culture that our identities 
are constructed by the market—products, not our role or place in society, communicate 
who we are, what we wear, and even what we think.
Moreover, the events of 9/11 have added a new element for consideration, at least to 
Americans: global terrorism. President George W. Bush, in his bid to go after the 
terrorists, told the world, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. 
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”  ̂ According to American 
philosopher Richard Rorty, “Disagreement with Washington by foreign governments is 
being treated by the Bush White House not as honest difference of opinion but as the
From George W. Bush’s “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United 
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11.” 20 September 2001.
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failure of knaves and fools to accept guidance from the wise, farsighted, and benevolent” 
(23).
At home, Americans opposed to the war have been attacked as ««-American and anti- 
democratic. For example, after making anti-war comments at a concert in London just 
prior to the start of the war, the Dixie Chicks, an American country music band, were 
branded “traitors” and “Saddam’s angels,” among otber things, by many Americans, 
including former fans (Segal). According to tbe Chicago Tribune, “radio stations across 
the country dropped the Chicks from their playlists after receiving a flood of protests 
from irate listeners who did not appreciate the Chicks speaking ill of Bush” (Chicks 
Nicked). It became an ‘either/or’ situation as the patriotism of those who did not feel the 
war was justified was questioned. Surely, such an ultimatum can only serve to divide 
further the world. Barber posits, “An America that comprehends the realities of 
interdependence and wishes to devise a democratic architecture to contain its global 
disorder cannot ask others to either join it or else ‘suffer the consequences.’ [. . .] Rather, 
America must join the world on whatever terms it can negotiate on an equal footing with 
the world” {Jihad V5. McWorldxxi).
If the purpose of globalization is to create a global democratic community, then the 
President’s message is surely not in line with that directive. Many sectors of the world are 
resisting this current form of globalization, but Barber argues that it is not democracy 
they are resisting; it is Westernization, or, McWorld. He believes the U.S. must work 
“multilaterally” with other nations to fill the chasm created by tbe hegemonic tendencies 
o f corporate globalization. “Yet in the last ten years,” Barber contends, “the United States
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has intensified its commitment to a political culture o f unilateralism and faux autonomy 
that reinforces rather than attenuates the effects of McWorld” {Jihad vs. McWorld xxi).
Democracy is not about individualism, consumption, and materialism. It is about real 
communities and the citizens of those communities, equality, concern for the issues, and 
nurturing. Barber writes, “Market relations are simply not a surrogate for social relations, 
let alone for democratic social relations [. . .]” {Jihad McWorld 237). Furthermore, if 
democracy represents the will of the people as reflected in the actions of the government, 
then the disintegration o f government so inherent in economic globalization is certainly 
««ri-democratic.
Tensions between East and West
The Bush Administration’s actions in Iraq over the past few years have fueled fears of 
neocolonialism^ and have further polarized Eastern and Western societies.
Communication scholars Stephen John Hartnett and Laura Ann Stengrim state, “[...] 
President George W. Bush has embarked on a course of empire-building colonialism, 
complete with U.S. armed forces and companies stationed indefinitely in foreign lands— 
Afghanistan and Iraq for now, with more likely to come—ruled by governments that [...] 
are mere puppets for U.S. power” (10). Additionally, their threats to other non-Western 
nations, such as North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan only confirm— in the minds of
 ̂Peter Childs and R.J. Patrick Williams, in An Introduction to Postcolonial Theory 
(1997), characterize neocolonialism as the modem phenomenon or condition in which the 
developed world continues its hegemonic grip on the subaltern. “In the period after 
decolonization,” they write, “it rapidly became apparent (to the newly independent 
nations, at least) that although colonial armies and bureaucracies might have withdrawn, 
Western powers were still intent on maintaining maximum indirect control [. . .] via 
political, cultural and above all economic channels [.. .]” (5).
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many— the U.S. desire for global control. According to American historian Richard 
Crockatt, “A common thread among virtually all responses from the Middle East and the 
Muslim world in general is the profound conviction that the United States has 
consistently pursued policies that were against Arab and Muslim interests and in favor of 
those of Israel” (69). These acts of hegemonism— of seeking to control and influence 
other nations—undermine all peacekeeping efforts and attempts at democratization.
On the surface, U.S. actions and the accompanying rhetoric are framed in terms of 
morality and civility, and the pursuit of a peaeeful, united world. However, the Bush 
Administration’s decision to attack Iraq in March of 2003 has only amplified tensions 
between East and West. As President Bush justified his actions in Iraq through his war on 
terror speeches, the ways in which he framed each side was evident. Just as Edward Said, 
the literary theorist and activist who is regarded as the founding figure in postcolonial 
theory, points out in his seminal work. Orientalism, the West (the United States) is 
depicted as moral, kind, patient, and civilized, while the East (Iraq) is rendered 
dangerous, aggressive, hateful, evil, uncivilized, and completely incapable of fending for 
themselves (300).
These depictions suggest superiority on the part of the West, while relegating the 
East to a decidedly inferior status. In An Introduction to Postcolonial Theory, Peter 
Childs and R.J. Patrick Williams write, “One of the most influential aspects of 
Orientalism has been Said’s examination of the way in which the West not only 
constructs the Orient, but constructs it precisely as its Other, the repository of all those 
characteristics deemed non-Westem [and therefore negative]” (101). The practice of 
Orientalism by Western cultures is the social, cultural, and political construction of the
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East from a Western viewpoint, not as how it truly exists. According to Childs and 
Williams, Orientalism is more dominant now than it was in the past, simply because it is 
linked to global politics and policymaking, and because of Eastern portrayals in the 
media (101). Orientalism, then, is motivated by the W est’s desire for rationality and need 
for explanation. We are drawn by the East’s enigmatic qualities, but fear that which we 
do not know or understand.
One of the predominant criticisms of the Bush Administration has been its defiance of 
the United Nations and its unilateralist attack on Iraq. In From 9/11 to Terror War, noted 
critical theorist Douglas Kellner writes, “[WJhereas a sane global policy against the 
international threat o f terrorism would involve bringing in as many Arab allies and other 
countries as possible in the war against Islamic extremism, Bush’s ‘doctrine’ was likely 
to alienate both Arabs and allies in the struggle” (213). Alienate it did. Kellner continues, 
“Although Bush’s arrogant posturing was playing well domestically, it was faring ever 
more poorly in the global arena where it is necessary to gain allies to effectively fight 
terrorism” (213). The Bush Administration’s insular and self-absorbed attitude may be its 
downfall. In America Alone, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, both experts in U.S. 
foreign policy issues, contend, “The United States now finds itself uncomfortably 
isolated within the international community; anti-American feelings have risen quickly; 
and the nation confronts an increasingly dangerous and complex security environment. 
[...] Under [the Bush Administration’s] influence, America has, sadly, lost legitimacy” 
(297).
10
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Focusing on Global Issues in Communication
We are living in a time of intense change, and the issues of globalization, culture, 
terrorism, hegemony, and democracy have become inextricably linked. The current 
trends in globalization play an important role in the war on terror, in the U.S. role in the 
global community, and in how the U.S. is perceived by other nation-states. Social and 
political theorist Carl Boggs asserts, “The immorality and hypocrisy of such U.S.- 
engineered catastrophes deserve far more attention than they have received in the media, 
the academic world, and the political arena” (3-4). Consequently, it is important to study 
the impact of the Bush Administration’s framing of the war on terror and of the Other, 
and the implications it had and will continue to have not only on the American public, but 
on the global community as a whole.
With the onslaught of globalization and the supposed interdependence of the global 
community, it is vital that communication scholars look at how leaders and other key 
players (including the media) communicate from a broader, more universal perspective. 
Indeed, communication plays a large role not only in globalization, but in global 
terrorism and the war on terror. In his 1998 address to the International Communication 
Association, communication scholar Peter Monge states that “those whose work adopts a 
global perspective comprise a small fraction of communication scholars. Most of the rest 
of us in the communication discipline are just beginning to respond to the global 
imperative” (143). Since the publication of Said’s Orientalism, scholars have been 
building on its theoretical underpinnings. In the communication field, according to Raka 
Shome and Radha Hegde, “recognizing the postcolonial politics of communication opens 
up new vistas for communication scholarship” (249). While many critics and scholars
11
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have since written about the effects o f 9/11 and the war in Iraq, few have analyzed the 
political, cultural, and ethical implications of dominant discourse from a global 
perspective. In “Communication in the Global Community,” Patricia Riley and Peter 
Monge write, “The difficult problems and complex transformations in this smaller world 
require scholars to question the inevitability of globalization’s supposed outcomes [...]. 
Similarly, understanding the role o f communication in the building [and destroying] of 
communities in this changing environment is critical” (355). In light of the events that 
have taken place since September II , 2001, the need to focus on global issues in 
communication has never been greater.
Chapter Outline
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Bush relied on his public addresses to 
unite the American public and justify going to war in Iraq. Although much of the global 
community was outraged by what he had to say, the American public, for the most part, 
stood behind him and his administration and supported the decision to go to war. This 
study is a close textual analysis of four of Bush’s war on terror speeches that illuminates 
how framing an issue can affect the way we perceive it.
My analysis draws from two critical approaches—postcolonial theory, which 
addresses the relationship between East and West, and critical discourse analysis, which I 
use to examine and scrutinize the relationship between discourse and dominant ideology. 
In Chapter 2 ,1 describe these approaches as they relate to my study. After introducing the 
speeches and explaining their salience. Chapter 3 focuses on a descriptive textual analysis 
to reveal thematic elements and key patterns. In Chapter 4 ,1 discuss the implications of
12
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the speeches and the responses from critics, the American public, and the global 
community. In addition to explaining the significance from a communication 
perspective, I address the global and ethical implications. Chapter 5 serves as my 
conclusion.
13
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE/METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
This study utilizes two critical approaches—postcolonial theory and critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). In recent years, postcolonial theory has emerged in the field of 
communication studies as a way to expose dominant discourses and practices. In the 
introduction to Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, Patrick Williams and 
Laura Chrisman write, “If one of the most spectacular events of the twentieth century was 
the dismantling of colonialism, in the shape of the European overseas empires, then one 
of the less immediately perceptible—but ultimately more far-reaching in its effects and 
implications—has been the continued globalising spread of imperialism” (1). Edward W. 
Said’s Orientalism timelessly exemplifies the political and cultural inequalities that 
continue despite decolonization, and much of postcolonial theory is based on his study. 
Specifically, I find Said’s treatment of the conflict between Western and Middle Eastern 
ideals exceptionally germane to my study. For example, he writes, “[T]he principal 
dogmas of Orientalism exist in their purest form today in studies of the Arabs and Islam. 
[...] one is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, 
developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior” 
(300).
14
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Similarly, postcolonial theory is a response to the continued subjugation of the 
“colonized” by the “colonizer;” it seeks to expose discourse that is socially, culturally, 
and politically constructed through Western ideals. In “Postcolonial Approaches to 
Communication: Charting the Terrain, Engaging the Intersections,” postcolonial scholars 
Raka Shome and Radha Hegde offer this definition: “Postcolonial studies, broadly 
described, is an interdisciplinary field o f inquiry committed to theorizing the 
problematics of colonization and decolonization. As a field it is positioned within the 
broader critical project of cultural studies that has had so much influence in 
communication scholarship” (250). Given the nature of my study, 1 believe postcolonial 
theory is one of the most effective and appropriate lenses through which to view 
President Bush’s speeches.
Furthermore, I feel CDA is the most suitable method in which to examine and 
scrutinize the relationship between discourse and dominant ideology. Teun A. van Dijk, 
editor of the journal Discourse & Communication, explains that CDA “go[es] beyond 
mere description and explanation, and pay[s] more explicit attention to the sociopolitical 
and cultural presuppositions and implications of discourse analyses” (Editor 131).
Postcolonial theory and critical discourse analysis are arguably more ideological than 
theoretical. They offer a specific way of viewing dominant discourse, and with that, 
consequently, come presuppositions and assumptions. After listening to President Bush’s 
war on terror speeches, I deliberately chose postcolonial theory and CDA to expose what 
I believe to be hegemonically-constructed rhetoric. Below, I will more thoroughly 
explicate these perspectives and establish their relevance to this study.
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Postcolonial Theory
Many postcolonial scholars believe the emergence of corporate globalization has 
become the new “colonialism.” Despite claims that this new global community represents 
equality, inclusion, and opportunity, hegemonic practices by global powers still exist. 
Shome and Hegde write;
The rhetoric of multiculturalism celebrates the diverse assemblage of 
cultures in their pristine flavors— colorful yet standing separate in their 
authenticity. [However,] The liberal approach to multiculturalism is 
couched in a sanitized version of difference where the unspoken centers of 
power, and the normativity of whiteness, remain unquestioned. This 
cosmetic approach to multiculturalism does not question the systemic 
structures of power nor does it touch the contradictions and tensions 
written into the realities of everyday life. (262-263)
In reality, the colonial power structure remains, albeit in a much more subtle way, and 
the formerly colonized—the Other— are still under the imposing grip of the elite. Many 
issues materialize from a communication standpoint, not the least of which is the ability 
of the West to impose its “messages” on other cultures. Postcolonial theory has thus 
emerged within the communication discipline as a response to the indirect subjugation of 
the Other by dominant cultures. Shome and Hegde assert, “The driving force of 
postcolonial work is to interrogate the universalizing discourse of Western modernity” 
(262). It is used to analyze what postcolonial scholars often refer to as «eocolonial 
discourse. In addition, with American/Western influences becoming the dominant global
16
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cultural paradigm, it is one of the most effective ways to research these new 
“communities,” for it recognizes that hierarchical structures still exist.
Postcolonial theory is seen by its proponents as a system by which cultures, 
previously (and, as is the case, currently) mired in Western ideology, can be given a 
voice. Scholars do acknowledge that the communication discipline is embedded within 
Western thought and practices. Shome and Hegde write, “Taking into account the 
historical genealogy of the field, a postcolonial intervention pushes for more socially 
responsible problematizations of communication. It is these critiques that will lead 
eventually to the production of a more just and equitable knowledge base about the third 
world, the other, and the ‘rest’ of the world” (261). In this sense, if  postcolonial theory 
benefits the “receivers” of dominant discourse, then many “groups” are affected: culture, 
class, race, and gender. Moreover, postcolonial theory benefits those within the Western 
culture by exposing the ignorance inherent in “Western representations of non-Westem 
sites” (Kraidy 318), for the Western image of Otherness has the potential to shape how 
we perceive people in other countries. Negative stereotyping of the Other, for example, 
tends to exaggerate ideas of difference, and reinforces perceptions of cultural and moral 
superiority.
Postcolonial scholarship is intrinsically linked to other liberal theories. Shome and 
Hegde write, “To a large extent, the critical impulses informing postcolonial studies are 
reflected in much of the left leaning scholarship, including cultural studies, Marxist 
theory, feminist theory, postmodern theory, queer theory, and more” (251). In her 
posteolonial feminist critique of National Geographic’s “millennium” issue, postcolonial 
scholar Radhika Parameswaran found the same old stereotypes to be prevalent. Her case
17
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study of the magazine’s depiction of globalization reveals a dichotomous relationship that 
harkens back to traditional feminine/masculine representations. She writes, “In the binary 
oppositional narrative o f East vs. West as spiritual vs. material, the spiritual, conjoined 
with fatalism and mute acceptance of nature was gendered feminine, and the material, 
constituted by logic, aggressive questioning of destiny, and the desire to conquer, was 
identified as masculine” (305).
Similarly, international communication scholar Marwan Kraidy finds in his study of a 
series of articles in the Washington Post entitled “American Popular Culture Abroad,” 
that global audiences are depicted as the “submissive female,” while U.S. popular culture 
is depicted as the “dominant male.” This goes back to my earlier assertion that Western 
discourse remains constructed through dominant ideologies, and while it certainly can be 
argued that many Eastern cultures are male-dominant (some going so far as to mistreat 
and abuse women and children), it stands to reason that these Western constructions only 
reinforce such practices. We cannot ask a people to alter their traditions, yet continue, 
albeit in a much more subtle fashion, doing the same.
In her study, Parameswaran questions National Geographic’s depiction o f the non- 
Westem world, and refers to the “influence” that such media have “on their elite and 
largely male audience members, who wield power in the global commercial and political 
arenas” (289). Her study is premised upon the following questions:
1. How does the Geographic portray the impact of Western consumer modernity 
on non-Westem cultures?
2. What representations of femininity, masculinity, race, and nation become 
alloyed with global culture in the magazine’s arresting photographs?
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3. What troubling aspects of globalization does this magazine, which purports to 
be an authoritative window on the world, ignore and disavow? (289) 
Parameswaran uses textual analysis to answer her questions, and consequently finds that 
“postcolonial theories of representation empower media crities to disrupt and denaturalize 
the subtle hegemony of the discursive myths that constitute the logie of globalization” 
(289X
Foeusing on the hybridity aspect of postcolonial theory, Kraidy approaches his text 
using Derridean deconstruction. His findings reveal two distinct meanings within the 
P ost’s discourse: the explicit message in which hybridity is portrayed as “enlightened 
diversity,” and another less obvious, implicit representation o f “eultural hegemony”
(325). Ultimately, Kraidy asserts, “hybridity is appropriated in an attempt to fix the 
meanings constructed by global audiences in their reception of U.S. popular culture”
(331). For example, Hollywood exeeutives justify the lack of minority actors in American 
films by stating that foreign audiences are not interested in “ethnic” or “female” movies. 
In doing so, they transfer blame to the global (submissive) audience. Whether explicit or 
implicit, U.S. culture emerges as the dominant construct.
Like feminist and Marxist theory, postcolonial theory is not based on a hierarchical 
construct, but rather a fluid dynamic; consequently, it does not rely on any one method. 
“Because its questions emerge from larger social contexts, its method is therefore shaped 
by the questions posed by the contexts,” Shome and Hegde explain (258). However, they 
emphasize the importance of methodologieal reflexivity: “While working within a eertain 
philosophieal or methodological tradition [be it deconstruction or ethnography], 
postcolonial scholars remain acutely aware of the history, heritage, and legacies o f such
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methods, and the dilemma that consequently confronts the researcher” (259). In addition, 
representation of the Other should take into account cultural and historical differences— 
partieipants should not all be “lumped” together as the oppressed or the Other, for this 
only reiterates a power structure the postcolonial theorist is trying to avoid. Identity, 
particularly cultural and political identity, is paramount to the creation of a more equal 
multicultural society.
Critiques o f Postcolonial Theory 
Despite the recent popularity of postcolonial scholarship, it does have its critics. 
Communication scholar Anandam Kavoori argues that “postcolonial theory [ . . . ]  ignores 
the politics of its own placement in western academe and its singular ties to the workings 
o f global capitalism” (196). He sees a disjuncture in the term “post-colonial” and the 
issues of imperialism and hegemony it seeks to expose. How can post-colonial theory 
reveal the problematie effects of colonial discourse? More importantly, how can Western 
scholars utilize a theory that seeks to discredit the discourse of a culture to which they 
belong? Shome’s response^ is rather terse:
[. ..]  isn’t that the very predicament of the postcolonial subject position? 
That the ‘knowledge structure’ in which many post-colonial intellectuals 
are/were trained was itself an effect of colonialism to which they were and 
are ‘subject’? Indeed, isn’t the very predicament of the ‘postcoloniaT 
position that we have [or had] little choice in this matter as we are 
‘subject’ to colonial intellectual domination in ‘other worlds’ as
 ̂ Shome’s article, “Caught in the Term ‘Post-ColoniaT: Why the ‘Post-Colonial Still 
Matters,” is a response to Kavoori’s criticism of the term “post-colonial” in “Getting Past 
the Latest ‘Post’: Assessing the Term ‘Post-Colonial.” Both articles can be found in 
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 15 (1998).
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‘knowledges’ from the ‘W est’ travel through global circuits of power and 
limit [and in some cases wipe out] the means for producing ‘indigenous’ 
knowledge? (209)
To illustrate her point, Shome refers to feminist theory, arguing that Kavoori’s “logic” 
would require that feminist theorists not use feminist theory if  they were trained in male- 
dominant Western academia.
Ella Shohat, an expert in Middle Eastern studies and another outspoken critic of 
postcolonial studies, posits, “The term post-colonial carries with it the implication that 
colonialism is now a matter o f the past, undermining colonialism’s economic, political, 
and cultural deformative-traces in the present. The ‘post-colonial’ inadvertently glosses 
over the fact that global hegemony, even in the post-cold war era, persists in forms other 
than overt colonial rule” (326). Shome counters that “post” represents the phase (or, 
perhaps, space or time), whereas neocolonial or colonial represents the condition: “[Post­
colonial] is a project that attempts to examine various colonial relations that mark and 
emerged (albeit unevenly) in various post-colonial spaces” (207).
Shome and Hegde write, “The postcolonial approach to question, reframe, and rethink 
epistemic assumptions is inspired by the spirit of resistant enquiry, the drive to return the 
colonialist gaze” (264). In my view, postcolonial theory is a valid and important part of 
communication studies as it offers an alternative perspective while dismantling and 
exposing dominant discourse. Despite eritics’ claims that “postcolonial” undermines the 
very essenee o f the colonial experience (by insinuating that colonialism is no longer 
practiced), I believe it is imperative that scholars look at dominant discourse through a 
lens unclouded by eultural assumptions and judgments.
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Critical Discourse Analysis
Like postcolonial theory, CDA challenges the inequalities and abuses o f power 
inherent in dominant ideology. Its primary focus is social and political issues, and it 
ultimately hopes to effeet change through a critical understanding of the relationship 
between dominance and discourse. According to van Dijk, CDA centers on ‘"the role o f  
discourse in the [re]production and challenge o f  dominance. Dominance is defined here 
as the exercise of soeial power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in soeial 
inequality, [...]” (Principles 249-250). In that respect, CDA focuses on “top-down 
relations of dominance”—meaning it looks not so much at the persuaded as it does the 
persuader. “[0]ur critical approach prefers to focus on the elites and their discursive 
strategies for the maintenance o f inequality,” writes van Dijk (Principles 250).
CDA also focuses on the power strategies used to justify and legitimate dominant 
actions. According to van Dijk, “‘modem’ and often more effective power is mostly 
cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other 
stratégie ways to change the mind o f  others in one’s own interests" (Principles 254). In 
the Bush Administration’s war on terror, for instance, fear and morality are used to 
manipulate and persuade American audiences to support U.S. actions in Iraq, van Dijk 
writes, “One major function of dominant discourse is precisely to manufacture such 
consensus, acceptanee and legitimacy of dominance” (Principles 255). Consequently, 
CDA is eoncerned with power abuse, and the moral and ethical implications of such.
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In “Discourse and Manipulation,” van Dijk applies CDA to a speech by British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair regarding the war in Iraq to illustrate the use of manipulation.^ He 
finds that “the most influential form of manipulation does not focus on the creation of 
specific preferred mental models, but on more general and abstract beliefs such as 
knowledge, attitudes and ideologies” (368). Once the intended target has been influenced, 
“little or no further manipulation attempts may be necessary in order for people to act 
according to these attitudes” (369). This can be especially true in the face of certain 
events, such as the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, by playing on fears 
and insecurities. Van Dijk feels that ‘victims’ of manipulation generally encompass 
certain fundamental values, an “incomplete or lack of relevant knowledge,” vulnerability 
in the face of tragedy, and “social positions, professions, status, etc. that induce people 
into tending to accept the discourses, arguments, etc. of elite persons, groups or 
organizations” (375).
In the case of Blair’s speech to members of the British parliament, van Dijk argues 
that while “[they] are not exactly stupid people,” they are “less powerful than the 
government [Blair and his administration]” (379). Consequently, “Blair defines the 
situation in such a way that few MPs can refuse, even when they know they are being 
manipulated and probably lied to” (380).
Intercultural communication scholar Tatyana S. Thweatt uses CDA to investigate the 
representation of immigrants and refugees in a series of articles and editorials from the 
local newspaper in a predominantly white community. Through her analysis, she finds
For the purposes of his study, van Dijk defines manipulation as “a communicative and 
interactional practice, in which a manipulator exercises control over other people, usually 
against their will or against their best interests.” For example, “politicians or the media 
manipulating voters or readers, that is, through some kind of discursive influence” (360).
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that news stories regarding immigrants and refugees are almost always negative, thereby 
contributing to the reproduction of racism and stereotyping. Specifically, the use of 
metaphors [i.e., the “flood” metaphors: “Refugees were repeatedly said to come in waves, 
they flooded  and even invaded the community”— Thweatt argues that these negative 
connotations “dehumanize” the refugees (34)], euphemisms, and semantic contrast 
emphasize the positive aspects of the members of the community, while negatively 
portraying Otherness. In one such case, “the burning of an ethnic restaurant [presumably 
by a member of the dominant group] was called an ‘unfortunate incident’” (35), while 
social problems and other complications within the immigrant/refugee population were 
emphasized. Thweatt’s analysis demonstrates how the media reproduces the “ideology of 
white dominance [i.e. ideology of consensus] by creating the ideological context that 
promotes stereotypes of inferiority and exclusion [...]” (40).
Categories of Analvsis 
CDA is multidisciplinary; therefore, methodological approaches are diverse. From a 
communication standpoint, and for the purposes of this study, a qualitative textual 
analysis of both discursive and cognitive structures and the use of language might reveal 
intended meanings. In “The Reality of Racism,” van Dijk lists potential categories of 
analysis:
• Actor Description. Van Dijk points out that “the overall ideological strategy is that of 
positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation” (214). This is one of the 
most critical and relevant aspects of CDA as it relates to my proposed study. “Models 
are being expressed and persuasively conveyed that contrast US with THEM, e.g. by 
emphasizing ‘our’ tolerance, help or sympathy, and by focusing on negative social or
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cultural differences, deviance or threats attributed to ‘them’,” writes van Dijk 
(Principles 263). This practice, prevalent during colonization, is also characteristic of 
modem corporate globalization and the resulting power stmctures, as well as the 
rhetoric of the war on terror.
• Authority. In this strategy, speakers refer to experts, moral leaders, and other authority 
figures to lend credence to their discourse (215).
• Consensus. In this political strategy, discourse implicitly states that WE must stand 
together. “[Ijngroup unification, cohesion and solidarity [WE against THEM], should 
prevail over party politics and division” (216). This is particularly relevant to the 
Bush Administration’s rhetoric, considering Americans are deeply divided on the war 
in Iraq.
• Example/Illustration. Van Dijk writes, “A powerful move in argumentation is to give 
concrete examples, often in the form of a vignette or short story, illustrating or 
making more plausible a general point defended by the speaker” (218).
• Fallacies. According to van Dijk, “These may pertain to any element of the 
argumentative event, namely to the nature of the premises, the relations among the 
premises and the conclusion, the relations between speaker and recipients, and so on” 
218).
• Implication. Meanings and messages are implied when explicit statements “could be 
interpreted as biased or racist” (220). In addition, vague meanings are used to de- 
emphasize those elements the dominant group wishes to keep from recipients.
• Lexicalization. In this strategy, the speaker uses different words with similar 
meanings to express a particular point o f view or opinion (220). For example.
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replacing “racism” with “xenophobia,” or “poverty” with “destitution” gives the 
discourse more gravity or formality.
• National Self-Glorification. This is another method of positive self-presentation.
• Polarization. This is the WE vs. THEM categorization.
• Populism. In this strategy, the speaker claims the people— “everybody”— support or 
do not support a particular idea (223); this method is much like the bandwagon 
fallacy.
• Victimization. “[W]hen the Others tend to be represented in negative terms, and 
especially when they are associated with threats, then the ingroup needs to be 
represented as a victim of such a threat” (224). 9/11 is often used to present America 
as the “victim.”
In Elite Discourse and Racism, van Dijk describes two more strategies;
• For Their Own Good. In this argument, which van Dijk refers to as “paternalistic,” 
the dominant group is engaging in something that is in the best interests of the Other. 
“This Apparent Empathy or Apparent Altruism move is again a functional part of the 
overall strategy of positive self-representation: We are doing something good for 
Them” (95).
•  The Numbers Game. In this strategy, figures are used to present information in the 
most persuasive manner. “This rhetorical use of quasi-objective figures, [...] is one of 
the most compelling scare tactics in the formation of public opinion” (107).
Finally, van Dijk refers to a very relevant (in terms of this study) discourse strategy in his
article “Discourse and Manipulation”:
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•  Generalization. This is a strategy “in which case a concrete specific example that has 
made an impact on people’s mental models is generalized to more general knowledge 
or attitudes, or even fundamental ideologies” (370). For example, the Bush 
Administration uses the tragedy of 9/11 to make general statements regarding 
terrorism and the war on terror.
As van Dijk points out, critical discourse analysis “must in turn be embedded in a 
broader social, political or cultural theory of the situations, contexts, institutions, groups 
and overall power relations that enable or result from such ‘symbolic’ structures” 
(Principles 259). In this sense, postcolonial theory can be used to establish the context 
and the implications of the discourse.
The aim of CDA is much like that of postcolonial theory— it seeks to analyze, 
understand, and expose the inequities inherent in dominant discourse and ideology, van 
Dijk states, “[Critical discourse analysts’] hope, if  illusory, is change through critical 
understanding. Their perspective, if  possible, that of those who suffer most from 
dominance and inequality. Their critical targets are the power elites that enact, sustain, 
legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice” (Principles 252).
CDA not only analyzes the ways in which dominant groups attack, discredit, and 
marginalize other groups, it also looks at the means by which they are able to manipulate 
public opinion. In the rhetoric regarding the war on terror, for example. President Bush 
uses his role as the leader of our country to have a “one-sided” conversation with the 
American public; we are aware of the situation based solely on his interpretation and 
discourse. According to van Dijk, “Such processes o f persuasion involve not only
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persuasive argumentation and rhetoric, or congenial opinions, but also the authority with 
which the politicians and the media are able to present such models” (Principles 268).
van Dijk recognizes the limitations o f CDA. He writes, “[It] does not yet provide 
solutions to problems or strategies to fight inequality. [...] Without a thoroughly founded 
criticism of those authorities or institutions who are responsible for the inequalities, we 
are no more than ‘free-floating intellectuals’” (Handbook 7). It does, however, “[provide] 
us with rather powerful, while subtle and precise, insights to pinpoint the everyday 
manifestations and displays o f social problems in communication and interaction” 
(Handbook 7).
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CHAPTER 3
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
In the aftermath of the September II , 2001, terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration 
faced an unusual situation. In his public addresses. President George W. Bush not only 
had to comfort and reassure the nation, he had to define the enemy and what came to be 
known as the “war on terror.” Perhaps more than any other time in history, the world 
was listening. In Plan o f  Attack, political journalist and Washington Post reporter Bob 
Woodward writes, “Roughly two-thirds of the American people thought Bush was a 
strong leader. They might disapprove of his performance as president, disagree with his 
policies or not like him, but a strong leader could generally prevail with his agenda if he 
stood up and pushed for it— in other words played politics” (91). In addition, due to the 
intense media coverage following the terrorist attacks, Americans were gripped with fear 
and a distrust of foreigners, particularly those of Arab descent. The conditions were 
optimal for a captive audience.
For this study, I have chosen four public addresses that represent the most crucial 
time in terms of gaining support from the American public as well as from a global 
audience. To illustrate the issues of dominance and marginalization, I have analyzed the 
following speeches:
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Address Before a Joint Session o f  the Congress on the State o f  the Union, January 29, 
2002. Although Bush’s address to the nation on September 20, 2001 marked the 
beginning o f his war on terror speeches, it was not until his 2002 State o f the Union 
address that he outlined the “Iraqi threat.” This speech—also known as the “Axis of 
Evil” speech in which North Korea’ , Iran, and Iraq are labeled as threats to the “peace 
of the world”—focuses on bringing Americans together, while polarizing US and 
THEM. Additionally, Bush defines the “enemy,” and sets the stage for military action 
outside Afghanistan; “Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This 
campaign may not be finished on our watch— yet it must be and it will be waged on 
our watch” (135). At this time, Americans, for the most part, supported the war in 
Afghanistan, but talk of war in Iraq was beginning to create a rift. With public 
support for the Bush Administration at “historic levels” (Online NewsHour), this 
speech gave Bush the opportunity to bolster support for his plans in the Middle East. 
Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002. After his 2002 
State of the Union address. Bush’s subsequent public addresses became part of a 
“campaign” in which he sought support for his Iraq policies. This speech was given 
on the eve of the congressional vote to authorize use of force against Iraq. The 
following morning, Washington journalist Karen De Young wrote, “Bush spoke 
in a televised speech aides said was scheduled so that he could explain his Iraqi 
policy directly to the American people. Although it seems likely that the resolution 
Bush seeks will pass both houses o f Congress by the end of the week, polls show that
’ Zbigniew Brzezinski, author of The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, 
writes, “The inclusion of North Korea in the ‘axis of evil’ was widely interpreted as a 
deliberate effort to obscure the narrower, one-sided American preoccupation with 
proliferation specifically in the Middle Eastern region” (32).
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public support is waning. Most Americans still support war against Iraq but have 
questions about its timing and the lack of support from allies” (A l). In this speech, 
Bush is very candid as he seeks to justify what he perceives to be the “Iraqi threat.” 
Address to the Nation on Iraq from  the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, May I, 2003. In this 
speech, which is also referred to as the “End of Combat” speech. Bush announces 
from the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, an aircraft carrier returning from the 
Middle East, that major combat operations have ended in Iraq. This speech is 
particularly salient for its context— Bush landing on the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln via 
military jet and clad in a flight suit plays out like a Hollywood production. Senator 
Robert C. Byrd, in a response to the President’s speech, writes, “As I watched the 
President’s fighter jet swoop down onto the deck of the aircraft carrier Abraham 
Lincoln, I could not help but contrast the reported simple dignity of President Lincoln 
at Gettysburg with the flamboyant showmanship of President Bush aboard the USS 
Abraham Lincoln” (par. 2). However, this speech follows a war whose massive 
television coverage allowed us to see the destruction and devastating loss of life. In 
this sense, the speech serves to justify the actions in Iraq while it establishes the 
strength and might of the United States.
Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 7, 2003. In the months 
following the “end of combat in Iraq,” it became quite clear to the American people 
that the war was not over. In this speech. Bush urges Americans to be patient: “This 
will take time and require sacrifice. Yet we will do what is necessary, we will spend 
what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to promote 
freedom and to make our own nation more secure” (1164). In addition, he emphasizes
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u s  vs. THEM and GOOD vs. EVIL to engage the continued support of the American 
public.
Together, these speeches define the “war on terror,” appeal to American 
exceptionalism, and create dialectical tensions that serve to demonize and marginalize the 
Other.
Thematic Elements and Key Patterns 
Through my examination of these speeches, I found that many of Teun van Dijk’s 
categories of analysis are applicable. For example, all of the speeches are polarizing— 
pitting US (America) against THEM (Iraq/Muslims). O f course, the United States is 
portrayed as moral, civilized, strong, and helpful, while they are rendered evil, 
aggressive, uncivilized, and weak or helpless. According to van Dijk, “If such ‘polarized’ 
models are consistent with negative attitudes or ideologies, they may be used to sustain 
existing attitudes or form new negative attitudes. One of the strategic ways to make sure 
that such generalizations are made is to emphasize that the current model is ‘typical’ and 
not incidental or exceptional, and that the negative actions of the Others cannot be 
explained or excused” (Principles 263-64).
Bush frequently cites the events of September 11, 2001, in his speeches. He does this 
by utilizing two rhetorieal strategies. On the one hand, he uses the tragedy of 9/11 to 
make generalized statements about the war on terror and Iraq. In doing so, he implies an 
association between the terrorist attaeks and Saddam Hussein. For example, “The battle 
o f Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11' ,̂ 2001, and still 
goes on. That terrible morning, 19 evil men, the shock troops of a hateful ideology, gave
32
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
America and the civilized world a glimpse o f their ambitions” (5/1/2003, 517). 
Furthermore, in his Cincinnati address he says, “The attacks of September the 11*'̂  
showed our eountry that vast oceans no longer proteet us from danger. Before that tragic 
date, we had only hints of Al Qaida’s [sic] plans and designs. Today in Iraq, we see a 
threat whose outlines are far more clearly defined and whose consequences could be far 
more deadly. Saddam Hussein’s actions have put us on notice, and there is no refuge 
from our responsibilities” (1720). A close reading of these paragraphs reveals that Bush 
does not directly link Saddam Hussein and 9/11; however, most audienee members will 
hear these sentences spoken together and assume a conneetion.
The other strategy involves presenting the United States and Amerieans as vietims.
As van Dijk points out in “The Reality of Raeism,” when the Other is presented as a 
threat, “then the ingroup needs to be represented as a victim of such a threat” (224).
Using such a tragedy to make general statements regarding the war on terror and 
presenting the U.S. as the victim both serve to justify going to war in Iraq and are 
certainly meant to play on the emotions o f the American public, but as Senator Robert C. 
Byrd points out in his response to the president’s May 1, 2003 “End of Combat” speech, 
“It may make for grand theater to describe Saddam Hussein as an ally of al Qaeda or to 
characterize the fall of Baghdad as a victory in the war on terror, but stirring rhetoric does 
not necessarily reflect sobering reality. Not one of the 19 [...] hijackers was an Iraqi. In 
fact, there is not one shred of evidence to link the September 11 attack on the [U.S.] to 
Iraq” (par. 5).
Another strategy that Bush often employs is to give examples or tell personal stories 
to illustrate a point or create a more forceful impact on his audience. For example, in his
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2002 State of the Union Address, Bush says, “For many Americans, these 4 months have 
brought sorrow and pain that will never completely go away. Every day a retired 
firefighter returns to Ground Zero to feel closer to his two sons who died there. At a 
memorial in New York, a little boy left his football with a note for his lost father: ‘Dear 
Daddy, please take this to heaven. I don’t want to play football until I can play with you 
again some day’ ” (134). These vignettes not only play on the theme of “victim” by 
referring to the horrific effects of 9/11, they evoke images that would tug at the heart of 
the most cynical American.
Similarly, Bush often refers to authority figures to lend credence to his assertions and 
to demonstrate cohesiveness. For instance, in his Cincinnati address, he refers to a former 
chief weapons inspector to bolster his allegations that Saddam Hussein possessed 
weapons of mass destruction (1716-17). Additionally, in the same speech he implores, 
“America must not ignore the threat gathering against us,” and quotes President John F. 
Kennedy (1718). A bit later he says, “[T]wo administrations, mine and President 
Clinton’s, have stated that regime change in Iraq is the only certain means of removing a 
great danger to our Nation” (1719). Not only does he reference two very popular 
presidents, he references two Democratic presidents. The inference is one of consensus 
among Republicans and Democrats, and serves to appease those who may not support the 
idea of going to war in Iraq.
In the 2003 preface to his book Orientalism, Edward W. Said writes, “Reflection, 
debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings 
must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate 
American or Western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and regard
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other cultures with derisive contempt” (xxvii). A thorough analysis of the four speeches 
reveals a pattern used by Bush that justifies the war in Iraq primarily through positive 
self-presentation and negative other-presentation. While many of van Dijk’s categories of 
analysis are utilized, these war on terror speeches exemplify three distinct themes: 
American exceptionalism, demonization of Iraq/Muslims, and marginalization of the 
Other.
American Exceptionalism
Under the premise of American exceptionalism, the strength, morality, and civility of 
the United States and its citizens are emphasized. For example, when Bush announces 
that major combat operations have ended in his May 1, 2003 speech, he legitimates the 
U.S. action in Iraq by using such phrases as “noble cause” (516), “great moral advance” 
(516), and “patient justice” (517). He further justifies the war: “In these 19 months that 
changed the world, our actions have been focused and deliberate and proportionate to the 
offense” (517), and “American values and American interests lead in the same direction: 
We stand for human liberty” (517). And in his 2002 State of the Union address, he says, 
“America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and 
unchanging for all people everywhere” (138). The implication here is that we know what 
is best for all people.
Bush refers to the “civilized world” throughout all four speeches; in his September 7, 
2003 address, he asserts, “Terrorists in Iraq have attacked representatives of the civilized 
world, and opposing them must be the cause of the civilized world” (1165). O f course, 
the implication is that Iraq and the Middle East in general are “uneivilized.” As such. 
Bush draws largely upon positive self-presentation and national self-glorification, and he
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does so by presenting America as “the chosen,” by stressing that good—“we”—will 
prevail, and by utilizing consensus and populism to create a sense of solidarity.
A dominant theme in all of Bush’s discourse is that America and its citizens have 
been “chosen;” it is as if  we have been given the responsibility to rid the world of terror 
and “democratize” all nations. For example, in his 2002 State of the Union address, he 
asserts, “History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our 
responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight” (135). In the same speech, he 
insists that because we have been given this responsibility, we must act accordingly. He 
depicts Americans as unique, as having a duty or job to do. To lend even more gravity, he 
invokes God and history:
Beyond all differences o f race or creed, we are one country, mourning 
together and facing danger together. Deep in the American character, there 
is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism. And many have discovered 
again that even in tragedy— especially in tragedy— God is near.
In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the 
history of liberty, that we’ve been called to a unique role in human events. 
Rarely has the world faced a choice more elear or consequential. (138-39) 
In his Cincinnati speech, in which he feels the need to bolster support among average 
Americans, he continues his theme of “the chosen” while also creating a sense o f unity— 
a sense that we are all in this together. “We did not ask for this present challenge, but we 
accept it. Like other generations of Americans, we will meet the responsibility of 
defending human liberty against violence and aggression. By our resolve, we will give 
strength to others. By our courage, we will give hope to others. And by our actions, we
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will secure the peace and lead the world to a better day” (1720). He closes his September 
7, 2003, speech with: “Fellow citizens: We’ve been tested these past 24 months, and the 
dangers have not passed. Yet Americans are responding with courage and confidence. 
We accept the duties of our generation. We are active and resolute in our own defense. 
We are serving in freedom’s cause— and that is the cause of all mankind” (1166).
In addition to giving Americans a special status. Bush often avows that good (“we”) 
will overcome evil, in essence asserting that “we” will win the war. For example, “Our 
enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and 
selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil. The American people have responded 
magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve” (1/29/2002, 137). He 
also states, “Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency 
and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good” (1/29/2002, 138). In his 
October 7, 2002 speech, the need for stronger language is obvious: “And through its 
inaction, the United States would resign itself to a future of fear. That is not the America 
I know. That is not the America I serve. We refuse to live in fear. This nation, in World 
War and in cold war, has never permitted the brutal and lawless to set history’s course. 
Now as before, we will secure our Nation, protect our freedom, and help others to find 
freedom of their own” (1720).
Despite widespread support from Americans, Bush faced skepticism and opposition 
both at home and abroad regarding action in Iraq. Therefore, uniting Americans and 
creating a sense of solidarity was vital. Regarding the congressional vote to authorize the 
use of military force, he says, “The resolution will tell the United Nations and all nations 
that America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of the
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civilized world mean something” (10/7/2002, 1720). It was also important that he blur 
party lines. During his 2002 State of the Union address, he says:
September the 11*'’ brought out the best in America and the best in this 
Congress. And I join the American people in applauding your unity and 
resolve. Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed toward 
addressing problems here at home. I ’m a proud member o f my party. Yet 
as we act to win the war, protect our people, and create jobs in America, 
we must act, first and foremost, not as Republicans, not as Democrats but 
as Americans. (135-36)
Building on the theme of “the chosen,” Bush attempts to make Americans feel as if 
we have an important role in the war on terror. This, in turn, adds to the sense that 
Americans are unified. For example, in his “Axis of Evil” speech, he says, “And as 
government works to better secure our homeland, Ameriea will continue to depend on the 
eyes and ears of alert citizens” (136). He follows this statement with an illustration of the 
flight crew and passengers who subdued an Al Qaeda operative who was armed with 
explosives. In telling this story, ordinary Americans become heroes. It also instills a sense 
of fear, a sense that what happened on September 11, 2001 could happen again. Later in 
the same speech, he emphasizes once again that we have a role: “None of us would ever 
wish the evil that was done on September the 11‘̂ . Yet, after America was attacked, it 
was as if  our entire country looked into a mirror and saw our better selves. We were 
reminded that we are citizens with obligations to each other, to our country, and to 
history. We began to think less of the goods we can accumulate and more about the good 
we can do” (137) (emphasis added).
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Demonization of the Enemy
In his war on terror speeches, Bush creates a vivid portrait of the enemy. He 
accomplishes this predominantly through negative other-presentation, and also through 
fostering a climate of fear. In his 2002 State of the Union address. Bush sets the stage by 
stating: “What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our 
war against terror is only beginning. [...] Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the 
methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the 
world like ticking timebombs, set to go off without warning” (134). In addition to 
referring to “dangerous killers,” “murder,” and “outlaw regimes,” using the metaphor 
“ticking timebombs” lends the situation gravity and a sense of urgency. It also ties in with 
his speculation that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction.
Furthermore, the implication is that terrorists = Arabs/Muslims. For example, he says, 
“A terrorist underworld, including groups like Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-e- 
Mohammed, operates in remote jungles and deserts and hides in the centers of large 
cities” (1/29/2002, 135). All of these groups hail from the Middle East. Unfortunately, 
this reinforces Americans’ attitudes toward Arabs/Muslims in the aftermath of September 
11. According to the New York Times, hate crimes against Arab-Americans and Muslim- 
Americans increased dramatically immediately after 9/11. “From Sept. 11, 2001, to Feb. 
14, the F B I. said it opened 414 hate crime investigations involving attacks or threats 
against Arab-American targets, [...]. Among the crimes were murders, attempted 
murders and assaults and arson attacks against mosques and Arab-American owned 
businesses” (“F.B.I. Warns” A16).
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As Bush pinpoints the “Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State o f the Union address, he states 
that Iraq supports terrorism, and that they are developing anthrax (135). The significance 
of this, in light o f the events involving anthrax-laced letters that took place in the United 
States following 9/11*, is that Bush seems to be suggesting that Saddam Hussein may be 
responsible. This not only demonizes him, it makes Americans angry and fearful and 
therefore more willing to support Bush’s Iraq initiative.
He ends his “Axis o f Evil” speech by polarizing US and THEM: “Our enemies send 
other people’s children on missions of suicide and murder. They embrace tyranny and 
death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice, made long ago on the day 
of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity of every 
life” (139). Additionally, by referring to “our founding,” he appeals to Americans’ sense 
of patriotism.
Bush’s October 7, 2002, address to the nation is particularly salient as a vehicle for 
demonizing Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and the terrorists. With many Americans questioning 
the decision to go to war in Iraq, the speech is intended to make as strong a case as
* In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, letters contaminated with 
anthrax were sent through the U.S. postal system to NBC News anchor Tom Brokaw, 
Democratic Senator Tom Daschle, and Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, among others. 
According to the New York Times, “Since the anthrax attacks began, four people have 
died from inhalation anthrax, including two Washington postal workers, and six others 
have contracted the disease. At least seven people have contracted skin anthrax, a much 
less serious form of the illness that does not necessarily require hospitalization” (Shenon 
A1+). Although there was much speculation as to who was responsible— including “an 
organized terrorist group” (Johnston B6)— the F.B.I. has yet to solve this case.
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
possible. In it, he is very forthright; after thanking those in the audience for their 
attendance, he begins: “Tonight I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to 
peace and America’s determination to lead the world in confronting that threat. The threat 
comes from Iraq” (1716). He then uses such words as: “history of aggression,” “arsenal 
of terror,” “murderous tyrant,” and “merciless namre o f its regime” (1716). The use of 
such forceful language underscores the perceived threat of imminent danger.
In the same speech. Bush refers to Saddam Hussein as “a homicidal dictator who is 
addicted to weapons of mass destruction” (1717). O f course, “homicidal” is a very 
negative descriptor, but adding the word “addicted” implies— in the American lexicon— a 
sense of being out of control. Tying a lack o f restraint to “weapons of mass destruction” 
in a post-9/11 world undeniably plays on Americans’ fears. Furthermore, the phrase 
“weapons of mass destruction,” which is now almost exclusively associated with Iraq, is 
used liberally throughout all of Bush’s war on terror speeches, and has even become a 
popular and oft-cited part of the American lexicon, frequently referred to as “WMD.” In 
his Cincinnati address. Bush spends a good deal of time discussing weapons o f mass 
destruction, often giving very specific and technical details. For example, he says, “Iraq 
has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for 
gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons” (1718).
According to van Dijk, emphasizing irrelevant details is a form of manipulation; in order 
to “hinder understanding,” a speaker may use “more complex sentences and abstruse 
words” (Discourse 366). Giving such detailed information also underscores the severity 
of the situation, and gives Bush more credibility and authority.
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Much of Bush’s demonizing is used to justify going to war in Iraq. In his attempts to 
link Saddam Hussein and Iraq with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, he uses specific 
examples and numbers to strengthen his argument. For example, he says, “Over the 
years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terrorist 
organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or 
injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans. Iraq has also provided safe haven to 
Abu Abbas, who was responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro and killing an American 
passenger” (10/7/2002, 1717). Further into that speech. Bush invokes the memory of 
another dictator: “The dictator of Iraq is a student of Stalin, using murder as a tool of 
terror and control, [...]. On Saddam Hussein’s orders, opponents have been decapitated, 
wives and mothers of political opponents have been systematically raped as a method of 
intimidation, and political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being 
tortured” (1720). Comparing Saddam Hussein with Communist dictator Joseph Stalin is 
perhaps meant to stir up images of the Cold War, when Americans were so fearful of the 
enemy they rushed to build bomb shelters in their homes. In addition, talk of 
decapitation, rape, and torture bring to mind shuttering images o f unspeakable acts that 
surely resound with most Americans.
Finally, Bush utilizes what van Dijk refers to as “populism” to create a sense that 
everyone agrees or supports his ideas regarding Saddam Hussein. In his Cincinnati 
speech, for instance, he says, “Members of Congress of both political parties and 
members of the United Nations Security Council agree that Saddam Hussein is a threat to 
peace and must disarm. We agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten 
America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons.
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Since we all agree on this goal, the issue is: How can we best achieve it?” (1716). Later 
in the same speech, he asks, “If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons 
today— and we do— does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he 
grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?” (1717). Because of 
the way these questions are presented, it appears as if  the only logical approach is to go 
after Saddam Hussein.
Marginalization of the Other 
In his speeches. Bush often makes comments about or refers to Arabs/Muslims, 
particularly Iraqis, in ways that depict them as helpless and incapable of determining their 
own destiny. This is especially relevant to Said’s theory of Orientalism and the premise 
o f postcolonial theory. In the 2003 preface to Orientalism, Said writes.
What our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of 
understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, 
clean so that “we” might inscribe our own future there and impose our 
own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. It is quite common to 
hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the 
map of the Middle East, as if  ancient societies and myriad peoples can be 
shaken up like so many peanuts in ajar, (xviii)
As a consequence of these characterizations, the United States is often portrayed as 
“savior” or “gatekeeper.” The innuendo is that we must come to their—the Other— 
rescue. For example, in referring to what the United States has accomplished in 
Afghanistan, Bush declares, “In 4 short months, our Nation has [...] saved a people from 
starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression” (1/29/2002, 134). In another
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speech he says, “We continue to help the Afghan people lay roads, restore hospitals, and 
educate all of their children” (5/1/2003, 517). In both of these statements, the implication 
is that the Afghan people are completely helpless; they are, in essence, reduced to an 
imbecilic or childlike status.
America is often presented as the dominant force, and one that must fight not only for 
itself, but also the world. For example: “Our Nation will continue to be steadfast and 
patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down 
terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And second, we 
must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons from threatening the United States and the world” (1/29/2002, 134). In other 
words, WE MUST SAVE THE WORLD! In addition, he emphasizes the strength o f the 
United States over other nations: “My hope is that all nations will heed our call and 
eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. [...] But some 
governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If  they do 
not act, America will” (1/29/2002, 135).
In his September 7, 2003, speech. Bush justifies the lack of progress in Iraq by 
referring to World War II, in which the U.S. was ultimately successful:
America has done this kind of work before. Following World War II, we 
lifted up the defeated nations of Japan and Germany, and stood with them 
as they built representative governments. We committed years and 
resources to this cause. And that effort has been repaid many times over in 
the three generations of friendship and peace. America today accepts the
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challenge of helping Iraq in the same spirit—for their sake, and our own. 
(1164).
Of course, today both Japan and Germany symbolize modem capitalistic societies, much 
like the United States. Additionally, by stating that America “accepts the challenge,” 
Bush fosters that sense of solidarity.
In his 2002 State of the Union address. Bush asserts, “And we have a great 
opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring 
lasting peace” (138). The implication here is our values, which are perceived as better 
than those of the Other. In the ‘End of Combat’ speech, values are again highlighted:
“We are committed to freedom in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in a peaceful Palestine. The 
advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world. 
Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes hold, men and 
women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life. American values and American 
interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty” (517). The sense of 
moral superiority in these statements is palpable, and serves to further polarize US and 
THEM.
Additionally, Bush is often condescending when referring to Iraqis. For example,
“We are encouraging the orderly transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi 
people” (9/7/2003, 1165) (emphasis added). Also, “Iraq is ready to take the next steps 
toward self-government. [...]. From the outset, I have expressed confidence in the ability 
of the Iraqi people to govern themselves. Now they must rise to the responsibilities o f a 
free people and secure the blessings of their own liberty” (9/7/2003, 1165). Like the 
Afghan people in the earlier examples, the Iraqis are treated disparagingly; Bush’s
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rhetoric is arrogant and patronizing. The overt implication is that we are better than they 
are, and with our help, perhaps they will be able to take care of themselves. In addition, 
the innuendo is that we are providing them with the basic necessities of life: “Men and 
women in every culture need liberty like they need food and water and air” (5/1/2003, 
517).
Bush also often talks about what will come out of the war—the “rebuilding” process. 
For example, “We have difficult work to do in Iraq. W e’re bringing order to parts of that 
country that remain dangerous. [...] W e’re helping to rebuild Iraq, [...]” (5/1/2003, 517). 
He also states: “In Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people of that country to build a 
decent and democratic society at the center of the Middle East. Together we are 
transforming a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free 
institutions. This undertaking is difficult and costly— yet worthy of our country, and 
critical to our security” (9/7/2003, 1163). And, “This budget request will also support our 
commitment to helping the Iraqi and Afghan people rebuild their own nations, after 
decades o f oppression and mismanagement. [...] This effort is essential to the stability of 
those nations, and therefore, to our own security” (9/7/2003, 1165). O f course, both Iraq 
and Afghanistan will be “rebuilt” by our workers, with our money, and in the way we 
want it to be built.
By marginalizing the Other— in this case, the Iraqi and Afghan people— Bush 
completely negates their culture and way of life. For example, he states, “And America 
needs citizens to extend the compassion of our country to every part of the world. So we 
will renew the promise of the Peaee Corps, [...], and ask it to join a new effort to 
encourage development and education and opportunity in the Islamic world” (1/29/2002,
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138). “Development” and “opportunity” imply capitalistic—Western— endeavors. Once 
again, Bush insinuates that all people desire the American way of life:
America believes that all people are entitled to hope and human rights, 
to the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity. [...] America is a friend 
to the people of Iraq. Our demands are directed only at the regime that 
enslaves them and threatens us. When these demands are met, the first and 
greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, women, and children. [...] The 
long captivity of Iraq will end, and an era of new hope will begin.
[...] Freed from the weight of oppression, Iraq’s people will be able to 
share in the progress and prosperity of our time. If  military action is 
necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people 
rebuild their economy and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq 
at peace with its neighbors. (10/7/2002, 1720)
In order for democracy to have any hope of working in the Middle East, 
Arabs/Muslims must be treated with the dignity and respect that Bush insists “all people 
are entitled to.” While demonizing and marginalizing them may have helped earn the 
support of the American public, it is fueling tensions between East and West, 
strengthening stereotypes, and frankly, resulting in more terrorism.
My analysis of these four war on terror speeches reveals rhetoric that is constructed 
through American idealism and exceptionalism, and that fosters an ideology of 
dominance and inequality. In the next chapter, I will discuss the implications of this, as 
well as address the ethical concerns.
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CHAPTER 4 
EVALUATION
As many critics of the Iraq war have pointed out, it was necessary for the Bush 
Administration to “sell” the idea of invading Iraq to the American public as well as the 
global community. After all, neither Osama bin Laden nor al Qaeda had any apparent ties 
to Iraq or Saddam Hussein. In the months following the terrorist attacks, the 
administration began dialectically framing this perceived threat from Iraq in terms of 
good vs. evil in an effort to gamer the support it needed. In Hegemony or Survival, noted 
political thinker Noam Chomsky discusses the “propaganda” campaign aimed at linking 
Saddam Hussein and 9/11 : “The campaign [...] was highly successful in shifting 
attitudes. It soon drove American public opinion off the global spectmm and helped the 
administration achieve electoral aims and establish Iraq as a proper test case for the 
newly announced doctrine of resort to force at will” (3). The results of the massive public 
relations campaign waged by the Bush Administration have had— and will continue to 
have for some time to come— far-reaching effects. America’s future role in the global 
community is in question as many argue that we have lost our legitimacy.
O f course, many factors played a role in the outcome of the campaign. In addition to 
the general climate of fear following the terrorist attacks, America’s views of itself and 
the outside world go far in explaining reactions to President George W. Bush’s war on
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terror rhetoric. In this chapter, I will briefly explicate what it means to be “American,” 
and why anti-Americanism is so prevalent around the world. Additionally, I will discuss 
the political, social, cultural, and ethical implications of Bush’s war on terror speeches.
Americans and “Americanism”
According to many opinion makers and political pundits around the world, the Bush 
Administration successfully “duped” the American public into supporting a case for war 
in Iraq. But it is not quite as simple as framing an issue in a certain manner. Many factors 
contribute to the American psyche, particularly in the aftermath o f the terrorist attacks. 
When the two jetliners hit the twin towers of the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001, America’s sense of safety, of exceptionalism, and even its tendency toward 
insularity, were shattered along with the buildings.
It is not difficult to imagine the level o f fear most Americans felt in the wake of 9/11. 
Aside from the horrific events themselves, the cocoon in which America had been 
historically ensconced was penetrated. In times of crisis, it is only natural to rely on a 
figure of authority for explanation and reassurance. When Bush spoke to the American 
public in the days following the terrorist attacks, his strength and resolve were admirable. 
He was the rock on which his captive audience could lean. It was not long, however, 
before the Bush Administration began its campaign against Iraq and Saddam Hussein. 
Soon, as Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke point out, “The American public was 
barraged with a litany of doomsday scenarios” (209). Douglas Kellner posits that the 
“mass hysteria” created by the Bush Administration “render[ed] the population malleable 
to manipulation” (Media Spectacle 11). Consequently, while much of what was said in
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the war on terror speeches left many in the global audience as well as critics here at home 
skeptical, a majority of Americans were buying it. “Americans were more willing to 
believe that Saddam possessed WMDs and that a connection existed between Saddam 
and 9/11 and Saddam and Al Qaeda partially because they suffered from heightened 
levels of anxiety and fear of terrorism in the period following 9/11,” argue University of 
Southern California communication scholars Amelia Arsenault and Manuel Castells 
(289y
Psychologist Eileen L. Zurbriggen suggests Americans’ inability to see through the 
misinformation propagated by the Bush Administration corresponds to the inclination of 
trauma victims to be “blind” to a perpetrator’s actions when the victim is dependent on 
the perpetrator. In “Lies in a Time of Threat: Betrayal Blindness and the 2004 U.S. 
Presidential Election,” she writes:
In an era in which the United States is the sole global superpower, every 
citizen of this country [and, indeed, every living creature on the planet] is 
affected by the policies and actions of the U.S. president and is therefore 
dependent on him, at least to some extent. [...] It would then become more 
difficult for [them] to notice the administration’s deceptions and 
fabrications at the time they are being uttered, or to remember them 
clearly at a later date. (191)
In addition to the general tendency to respect the office of the presidency, Americans 
were deeply vulnerable in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and therefore easily 
swayed. It can certainly be argued that the Bush Administration took advantage of the 
collective frame of mind during this time. Benjamin R. Barber queries, “One might ask
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whether any terrorist can have spread fear more effectively than the American 
government inadvertently has done as it dutifully passes on random threats against 
unspecified targets and warns that further attacks are a virtual certainty” (Fear 25).
Another aspect of the American persona, as outlined in chapter 3, is a sense of 
exceptionalism. Barber writes, “From its founding, America regarded itself as unique and 
hence exempt from the laws that otherwise govern the life and destiny of other nations” 
(Fear 47). Americans have historically presented themselves as distinct. Indeed, posits 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, America possesses an “established inclination to see itself as the 
model for everyone else, with American preponderance even increasing the country’s 
sense of its moral vocation” (II). Stephen Hartnett and Laura Stengrim agree: “[...] 
many in the United States appear to think of the United States as the world, as if  the 
United States were not one nation among many but a universally accepted model to 
which the world must inevitably look for guidance” (283). As my analysis in chapter 3 
reveals, the Bush Administration relied on America’s vision of itself as exceptional to 
further its agenda regarding Iraq. According to Barber, “[Bush] has defined that war in 
terms of a vision of exceptional American virtue and a countervision of foreign 
malevolence that may strike outsiders as self-righteous [...] but which is powerfully 
motivating within the United States and which gives to his policies an uncompromising 
militancy invulnerable to world public opinion” (Fear 39).
It is this pride and sense of being unique that also creates a very strong nationalism 
among Americans. Richard Crockatt writes.
What is not in doubt is the allegiance o f a majority of Americans to certain 
profoundly unifying symbols, attitudes, and values that can collectively be
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c?A\eà Americanism. There is no more eloquent expression of this 
sentiment, which is sufficiently potent and historically grounded to qualify 
as an ideology, than the unity displayed by the American people’s reaction 
to September 11. (37-38)
The idea of being violated by the terrorists reinforced the notion of coming together, of 
being one nation. Crockatt posits, “America has always been by its natural composition a 
multicultural society, but that very diversity has placed a premium on adherence to 
symbols o f national unity and national distinctiveness” (15). For example, immigrants 
have always been encouraged to discard their “old world” identities and become 
completely American. This, in part, can explain why Americans are so receptive to the 
rhetoric o f US vs. THEM.
Another characteristic that can be identified as uniquely American is the desire for 
isolation. Although terrorist attacks occur more frequently in other parts of the world, and 
citizens around the world have become somewhat immune to the routine fear these 
attacks can cause, Americans have been—until September 11, 2001— somewhat isolated 
from this way of life. America has a long tradition of isolationism, of being insular and 
concerned primarily with domestic issues. Of course, the tendency toward isolationism is 
due predominantly to the desire for security, but its stance toward the outside world— 
particularly before globalization—has been perceived as one of disinterest. This, in part, 
has contributed to the animosity and anti-American sentiment so prevalent around the 
world. As Crockatt points out, “To the extent that America is a world unto itself, by 
virtue of its size, geographical location, social diversity, and economic dynamism, it is 
often insulated from the reactions that its activity in the world arouses” (8). Indeed, write
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Halper and Clarke, “Most Americans are today utterly unaware of the skepticism with 
which the United States is often viewed internationally, even in Britain” (237). This is 
perhaps why Americans were so shocked by the events of 9/11, and why we have only 
recently begun to understand the extent of anti-Americanism.
v^Mri-Americanism
The concept o f Americanism inspires both fascination and hatred among the world’s 
population. According to Crockatt, “Anti-Americanism was both a cause and a 
consequence of the terrorism of September 11 and, as such, it is central to an 
understanding of these events” (43). How the rest o f the world views America is often 
paradoxical. On the one hand, there is awe and allure. Perceptions of life in America are 
based on idealized and/or fantastical depictions in the preponderance of American film 
and television that has invaded the globe. Many cultures around the world have adopted 
American social and cultural standards, and citizens from all over the world emigrate to 
the United States to realize their “American Dream.” Nevertheless, this has also fostered 
resentment and even hatred as indigenous cultures slowly fade and are replaced by 
“McWorld.” It can be argued, however, that this is part of a natural process. Crockatt 
points out that, “[A]s the leading world power, the United States inevitably attracts 
opposition. Anti-Americanism has grown in step with the rise of the United States to 
world power. Like imperial nations of the past, the United States wields disproportionate 
power that is an object both of attraction and resentment” (46).
On the other hand, Ameriean foreign poliey and Ameriea’s politieal role in the global 
eommunity are almost universally regarded as questionable at best, and more often than 
not, as detrimental to the rest of the world. Chomsky cites a Time magazine poll in which
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“more than 80 percent o f respondents in Europe regarded the US as the greatest threat to 
world peace” (41). Specifically, America’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
as well as other Middle Eastern affairs has spawned the intense hatred and extreme 
behavior that resulted, among other events, in 9/11. According to Brzezinski, “There is 
no escape from the historic reality that American involvement in the Middle East is 
clearly the main reason why terrorism has been directed at America [...]” (30). 
Nevertheless, the Bush Administration appears oblivious to this fact, and their refusal to 
acknowledge it only intensifies the conflict. Bush spoke to America and the world the 
evening of September 11, 2001, about the evil that had occurred; however, writes Peter 
Singer,
A different president might not [...] have jumped to the conclusion that 
America was attacked because it is ‘the brightest beacon for freedom and 
opportunity in the world.’ That statement ignored Ameriea’s role in global 
politics, and especially in the Middle East. It therefore struck many people 
in other countries as a painful example of just how self-satisfied America 
is. (143)
Concurrently, Brzezinski states, “The unwillingness to recognize a historical connection 
between the rise o f anti-Ameriean terrorism and America’s involvement in the Middle 
East makes the formulation of an effective strategic response to terrorism that much more 
difficult” (31).
America is becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of the world because of the 
way it is asserting its superpower status. William Finnegan writes, “The depths of hatred 
that the United States has inspired in some of the world’s most oppressed comers may be
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ultimately unfathomable” (53). It is therefore imperative that America not only rethink its 
policies abroad, but truly consider the effects of its discourse and actions.
Discourse, Manipulation, and the War on Terror 
The Bush Administration knew they had to build up the perceived threat from Iraq in 
order to gamer support for a preemptive strike. With the help o f the media, Americans 
were inundated with horrifying images of terrorism. Halper and Clarke write, “Fear of 
terrorism provided the necessary glue to meld otherwise uncorroborated statements, 
assumptions, predictions, and ideas into a case for war. Official discourse tumed the 
assessment of a hypothetical danger into the absolute proof of a real danger” (209). 
Amerieans began to believe the rhetoric. According to Teun van Dijk, manipulation, 
which is a vital aspect o f critical discourse analysis, is inherently linked to power abuse. 
He writes:
[T]he general goals of manipulative discourse are the control of the shared 
social representations of groups of people beeause these social beliefs in 
tum control what people do and say in many situations and over a 
relatively long period. Once people’s attitudes are influenced, for instance 
on terrorism, little or no further manipulation attempts may be necessary 
in order for people to act according to these attitudes, for instance to vote 
in favor of anti-terrorism policies” (Discourse 369).
In other words, once the seed has been planted, beliefs and perceptions become rooted. 
According to Arsenault and Castells, “framing research suggests that after frequent 
exposure to pro-war coverage, subjects would be less likely to incorporate corrective
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information that threatened to disrupt the dominant news and political frame that the Iraq 
War was justified” (291). As Zurbriggen suggests, Americans became “blind” to the 
truth.
In March 2004, approximately one year after the attack on Iraq, the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Government Reform released a report, also known as the 
Waxman Report, entitled, “Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration’s Public 
Statements on Iraq.” This report examines the public statements— from speeches, 
television appearances, press conferences, and other interviews— made by the Bush 
Administration (President George Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice) regarding Iraq. According to the report, “[T]he five officials 
made misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 125 public appearances.
The report and an accompanying database identify 237 specific misleading statements by 
the five officials” (i). As the report points out, “The President and his senior advisors 
have a special obligation to describe accurately the national security threats facing the 
nation. [...] Members of Congress and the public see only a partial picture based on the 
information the President and his advisors decide to release” (1). This rather telling 
statement exemplifies the power of dominant discourse and power abuse.
The report specifies what each member o f the Bush Administration said in discourse 
leading up to the war in Iraq. For example, “President Bush made 55 misleading 
statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 27 separate public statements or appearances. 
[...] O f the 55 misleading statements [...], 4 claimed that Iraq posed an urgent threat; 14
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exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 18 overstated Iraq’s chemical or 
biological weapons capacity; and 19 misrepresented Iraq’s links to al Qaeda” (25).
Many of the statements to which the report refers come from the four speeches 
analyzed in this study. The report specifically cites Bush’s October 7, 2002, Cincinnati 
speech: “In this speech. President Bush made 11 misleading statements about Iraq, the 
highest number of misleading statements in any single appearance by any of the five 
officials. In this single appearance. President Bush made misleading statements about 
Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, Iraq’s efforts to procure aluminum tubes, Iraq’s chemical and 
biological capabilities, and Iraq’s connection to al Qaeda” (26). O f course, this speech 
took place just prior to the congressional vote to authorize force in Iraq. Although 
members o f Congress are generally thought to be part of the elite, in this case they were a 
part of the audience being manipulated.
Not only are Bush’s statements misleading and unethical, they undercut the trust that 
is placed in our elected officials. Kellner posits, “As the history of recent totalitarian 
regimes demonstrates, systematic deception and lying rots the very fabric of a political 
society, and if U.S. democracy is to find new life and a vigorous future there must be 
public commitments to truth and public rejection of the politics of lying” (16).
Implications
Because the United States is the world’s only superpower, the social, cultural, and 
political implications o f the Bush Administration’s war rhetoric are extensive, and each 
bears its own ethical concerns. In addition to the misinformation and lies, the four
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speeches analyzed in this study demonstrate a lack of understanding or, worse, concern, 
for political and ethnic differences.
In Bush’s war on terror speeches, he often refers to the societal benefits of the war; 
for example, how it will provide advantages to the Iraqi people by liberating them and 
giving them opportunities previously unavailable. He insinuates that a community that 
was tom apart by its leader— Saddam Hussein—will be rebuilt and be much more 
cohesive. It has not played out that way. With the increase in violence in Iraq and the 
threat of civil war, their sense of community has been completely shattered. In addition, 
because of the manner in which Iraq has been depicted domestically, most Americans 
now associate it with “weapons of mass destmction” (despite the fact that none were 
found), terrorism, and extremism. Most of the positive elements of Iraqi life, like the 
building of schools and hospitals, and voting and elections, are associated with the 
American presence. Once again, it gives the American public the impression that the 
Iraqis need us.
Negative framing of the Other has succeeded only in perpetuating stereotypes and 
misunderstanding of cultural and ethnic differences. This notion that we are a superior 
and more civilized society only serves to polarize further America from the rest o f the 
world. Moreover, the Bush Administration’s marginalization of the Other has, in effect, 
deprived them of a voice. The Iraqi people (those not labeled “terrorists”), as revealed in 
chapter 3, are portrayed as “incapable” and “weak.” This representation serves to justify 
the Bush Administration’s actions in Iraq, but it is a portrait viewed through American 
eyes; we refuse to acknowledge the existence of other ideologies or modes of living. In a
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true global community, all cultures must be equally represented and respected; difference 
must not only be tolerated, but also celebrated.
From an ethical standpoint. Bush’s misleading statements about Iraq not only hurt the 
Iraqis; he took advantage o f the American public when they were at their most 
vulnerable, van Dijk argues that the focus of manipulative discourse is on the societal and 
ethical consequences, because “[MJanipulation, socially speaking, is a discursive form of 
elite power reproduction that is against the best interests of dominated groups and 
[rejproduces social inequality” (Discourse 364). In essence, the effect is two-fold—by 
manipulating the American public with misleading information. Bush maintains his 
authority over his constituency, while subjugating the Other and therefore reinforcing 
negative stereotypes.
The political effects of the rhetoric of the war on terror are the most alarming, for 
they can be the most catastrophic. The United States has effectively isolated itself from 
the rest of the world with its political hubris; even its allies are backing away. According 
to Brzezinski, “Conduct that is perceived worldwide as arbitrary could prompt America’s 
progressive isolation, undercutting not America’s power to defend itself as such, but 
rather its ability to use that power to enlist others in a common effort to shape a more 
secure international environment” (4). The misinformation and demonizing of the Other 
in the war on terror speeches have served only to increase terrorism. Chomsky posits that 
the only link between Iraq and the threat of terror is that the invasion in Iraq has fueled 
the terrorists and has led to an increase in Al Qaeda recruitment (19). What is more, 
America’s insular and self-absorbed attitude may be its downfall. Brzezinski writes, “A 
hegemony is a transient historical phase. Eventually, even if not soon, America’s global
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dominance will fade. It is therefore not too early for Americans to seek to determine the 
shape of their hegemony’s eventual legacy” (213).
By defying international law and acting unilaterally, Bush effectively negated the 
power o f the United Nations. Some critics argue that his actions carry legal as well as 
ethical ramifications. Peter Singer states, “Bush’s claim that the United Nations would be 
irrelevant if  it did not agree to the use of force against Iraq showed that he had already 
decided that it was irrelevant— that is, that if  it did not go along with what he wanted, he 
would ignore its decision. [...] In the end, it was Bush who made the United Nations 
irrelevant in regard to Iraq” (192). What is of particular concern is that Bush is setting a 
precedent that may well affect future international disputes. Although the implicit 
meaning in disregarding the authority of the United Nations was that the United States, as 
the sole superpower, could do whatever it wanted, other nations may be inclined to do the 
same. Global chaos could ensue. As Singer points out:
Whether the danger posed by the combination of new weapons 
technologies with radical religious and political ideas can be controlled at 
all is something that only time will tell. In the long run, however, we are 
more likely to succeed in meeting this threat by international cooperation 
than by one nation acting unilaterally and in defiance of international law. 
American preeminence may well prove to be not only unjust, but a tragic 
mistake with catastrophic consequences. (200)
Another ethical concern is Bush presenting false or misleading information in his war 
on terror speeches. By justifying the attack on Iraq because Saddam Hussein possessed 
weapons of mass destruction, and linking him with al Qaeda and 9/11, Bush completely
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discredits himself as well as the United States. The complete and utter disregard for the 
truth will surely have negative effects in the future. Furthermore, when it became clear 
that Bush propagated misinformation, he refused to accept any blame or responsibility, 
essentially brushing off any criticism. Singer writes;
A person of good moral character who takes a false step will admit it, seek 
to understand what went wrong, and try to prevent something similar from 
happening again. When Bush’s use of misleading intelligence about Iraq 
was exposed, however, he blocked an open investigation into how he and 
his staff came to mislead the American public and the world about the 
basis on which he went to war. Instead, he made further inaccurate 
statements about when the intelligence was first known to be 
unsubstantiated and about the events that led to the decision to go to war. 
(225)
America cannot “go it alone.” It is imperative that America realign itself with its 
allies, and reestablish its leadership abilities. Moreover, if  globalization is going to work, 
an understanding and acceptance of diversity— of the Other—is imperative. As 
Brzezinski so succinctly puts it, “With America [...] fated to be the catalyst either for a 
global community or for global chaos, Americans have the unique historical 
responsibility to determine which o f the two will come to pass. Our choice is between 
dominating the world and leading it” (xi).
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION
As of October 30, 2007, the U.S. death toll in Iraq stands at 3,842; the number of 
wounded exceeds 28,000.^ Economically, the war in Iraq has thus far cost the United 
States over $464 billion,'** and according to New York Times columnist David Leonhardt, 
direct and indirect costs (for example, medical expenses for wounded veterans) could 
exceed $1.2 trillion. A recent poll of the Iraqi people found that a staggering 71% want 
U.S. troops to withdraw; the vast majority of them believe that the U.S. presence causes 
more conflict than it prevents (Kull). Terrorist activity has increased around the globe as 
U.S. actions have only strengthened the resolve of such terrorist organizations as al 
Qaeda and the Taliban. East and West are more sharply divided. The United States is 
looked upon with skepticism and distrust by much of the global community. These are 
but a few examples of the outcome of the Bush Administration’s war on terror.
The dominant discourse of the war on terror may have served a purpose at one time, 
but it was fleeting. While George W. Bush succeeded in persuading a majority of 
Americans to support a war in Iraq, ultimately he failed them. As Zbigniew Brzezinski 
points out:
According to the “Iraq Coalition Casualty Count” at 
<http ://icasualties. org/oif/default. aspx>
"* This figure is current as of October 30, 2007, and can be found at 
<http://nationalpriorities.org/Cost-of-War/Cost-of-War-3.html>
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The president must do more than stir the American people; he must also 
educate them. The political education o f a large democracy cannot be 
pursued by patriotic slogans, fear-mongering, or self-righteous arrogance. 
Every politician faces that temptation, and it is politically rewarding to 
yield to it. But harping on terrorism distorts the public’s vision of the 
world. It breeds the risk of defensive self-isolation, fails to give the public 
a realistic understanding o f the world’s complexities, and furthers the 
fragmentation of the nation’s strategic cohesion. (219-20)
As the holder of the highest office in the United States, the president has an 
overwhelming ability to influence public opinion. In this capacity, Bush is both morally 
and ethically responsible for the manner in which he informs the public, for not only does 
it affect our nation domestically, but with globalization the new reality, it affects 
America’s role in the global community. In this study, I have endeavored to reveal the 
effects of dominant discourse and examine and contextualize America’s emerging role in 
the global community by peering through a lens unclouded by Western assumptions and 
biases. Although Bush may have said that America was attacked because it is the 
“brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world,” in reality, America’s social, 
cultural, and political influences and practices around the world played a major role. In 
“The Real Axis of Evil,” George Katsiaficas writes:
The absurdity and tragedy o f such a world is made even more absurd 
and tragic by the profound ignorance and insensitivity of the wealthiest 
planetary citizens regarding the terrible plight of human beings in the 
periphery.
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In such a world, of course, there can be no lasting peace. As long as the 
wretched of the earth, those at the margins of the world system, are 
dehumanized, branded as terrorists, and kept out of decision-making, they 
have no alternative but to carry out insurrection and wage war in order to 
find justice. (350)
It is therefore critical that we look beyond the suicide bombers and the terrorist training 
camps and make a serious effort at understanding why terrorism exists.
Using postcolonial theory in the analysis o f dominant discourse is one such way to 
recognize the nuances of what is being said, for, as Raka Shome and Radha Hegde 
emphasize, “[t]he politics of communication are of central importance in the 
understanding of the contradictions and ambivalence in our deeply divided world” (261). 
In focusing on the fragile relationship between East and West, analyzing Bush’s war on 
terror speeches from a postcolonial point of view helped to expose subtle, implicit 
statements of racism— specifically, those that serve to demonize or marginalize the 
Other. Furthermore, using critical discourse analysis as a method for analyzing Bush’s 
war on terror speeches revealed how Bush attacked, discredited, and marginalized the 
Iraqis in order to sway public opinion. As Shome and Hegde point out, “[A] postcolonial 
intervention pushes for more socially responsible problematizations of communication. It 
is these critiques that will lead eventually to the production of a more just and equitable 
knowledge base about the third world, the other, and the ‘rest’ of the world” (261).
Despite the benefits of this study, there are a number of limitations. For one, 
“Americanism”— or, what it means to be “American”— is a complex and historical 
ideology as well as a rhetorical construction that deserves far greater attention than it was
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given here. A more thorough undertaking o f this topic would greatly enhance our 
understanding of the American public’s willingness to support the Bush Administration 
in their bid to go after Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Additionally, although George W. Bush 
delivered the four war on terror speeches analyzed in this study, many critics believe the 
real architects behind the Bush Administration’s war on terror are Bush’s (now former) 
senior political advisor Karl Rove and Vice President Richard Cheney. A more thorough 
study might include the rhetoric o f all key players. Finally, I would like to point out that, 
for the purposes of this study, I focused on American ignorance and insensitivity toward 
the Other— specifically, the Iraqis. However, I am fully aware that Americans, too, are 
often misunderstood and stereotyped, and I therefore emphasize that all peoples and 
cultures could benefit from a deeper understanding of the other.
When I began this project, very little scholarship centered on the global implications 
o f communication. Perhaps this study, and others like it, can begin to facilitate research 
and scholarship with a more universalizing perspective. Once again, the salience of 
studying dominant discourse within the context o f globalization must be emphasized, for 
communication is one of the foundations of globalization and the new global community. 
Richard Crockatt writes, “[GJlobalization influences all aspects o f life— the economic, 
political, social, and cultural—with the revolution in communications perhaps being the 
single most important novel factor, since the increase in speed and volume of information 
underpins changes in all the other spheres” (115). Future research could focus more on 
the role of communication in globalization, as well as the effects of new modes of 
communication on the Other. Additionally, a more in-depth look at the interplay of
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politics and communication could further our understanding o f dominant discourse and 
power abuse.
It is vital that we attempt to understand the root of the cause— why terrorists do what 
they do— rather than simply demonizing and marginalizing them. Until causes of 
terrorism are addressed, it seems unlikely that military action against terrorists alone can 
solve the problem. The Bush doctrine is void of diplomacy and is only creating more 
global strife and tension, not to mention terrorism. It is my hope that this study, in 
addition to providing insight into the importance of understanding other cultures and 
peoples, has furthered our understanding of dominant discourse and power abuse, and 
how they pertain to globalization and the global community.
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